Pilotes Québec

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-mideast/canadian-jets-to-help-enforce-no-fly-zone-over-libya/article1945738/singlepage/#articlecontent
Soyez vigilant les boys et faites attention à vous là-bas! :wink:

http://www.cyberpresse.ca/international/dossiers/crise-dans-le-monde-arabe/libye/201103/17/01-4380468-libye-le-canada-va-envoyer-six-avions-de-chasse.php?utm_categorieinterne=trafficdrivers&utm_contenuinterne=cyberpresse_B4_manchettes_231_accueil_POS2
Une version francaise :wink:

Soyez très vigilant les gars et prenez pas de chance inutiles.
Revenez nous tous sain et sauf. Nos pensées sont avec vous.

Jacques :D :D

Prudence ,prudence et encore prudence :wink: Nous sommes confiants et fiers de vous !
Dolorès

Est-ce que notre MRenaud sera de la partie ???

Prudence les boys !


Frank

Une nouvelle mission pour nos militaires, je suis pas inquiet l`équipe va mener la mission à bon port. ;)p

Martin

D'habitude, les noms ne sortent pas pour ce genre de chose. C'est une question de sécurité pour la personne et pour sa famille. Il y a déjà eu des menaces de mort de fait au famille de militaire. Tout dépendant de plusieurs facteurs on n'est pas autorisé la majorité du temps à divulguer ce genre d'information.

Je ne sais pas comment ça va marcher pour eux mais je sais que pour nous en Afghanistan c'était un gros non.

Je souhaites un gros ''merde'' aux gars de la 425 et bonne chasse! C'est à votre tour de vous ''gâter!'' après ne pas avoir été de la partie dans le carré de sable.

bonsoir
Ma question est peut être un peu discrète et discriminatoire :? :? mais sans nommé personne est ce que les femmes sont admises dans ce genre de mission :?: :?:
Dolorès :?

Je te dirais oui... Je ne vois pas pourquoi... il y a plusieurs femmes avec pas mal d'heures de vol sous la ceinture :lol: en afganisthan!

Je comprends très bien que l'on ne nomme personne dans ce genre de mission et c'est tout à fait correct.

Donc, je souhaite chance et courage à ceux et celles qui iront là-bas.


Frank

pipstah wrote:Je te dirais oui... Je ne vois pas pourquoi... il y a plusieurs femmes avec pas mal d'heures de vol sous la ceinture :lol: en afganisthan!

C est ce que je me disais , pourquoi pas :?: Alors soyez tous prudents
q:)p Pipstah Bonne soirée
Dolorès 8)

Merci au Canada pour tous ceux et toutes celles qui se battent pour leur liberté et pour des valeurs dont nous, qui en bénéficions depuis si longtemps, ne mesurons pas assez l'importance. Espérons que cette intervention, qui devrait commencer à partir de 14h30 GMT, n'arrive pas trop tard. Les dernières infos.

Même si je ne suis pas à même de juger de la pertinence des informations ci-dessous reçues par E-mail d'un ancien pilote de chasse, je me permets de les partager ici :

By Spencer Ackerman March 11, 2011

Keep the surveillance planes flying. Fry the radar. While the sun hangs in the sky, let Libya’s pilots know they’re on borrowed time if they take off.

There’s a lot of talk about setting up a no-fly zone over Libya — especially now that Moammar Gadhafi used his planes to take the oil refinery city of Ras Lunuf back from the rebels, and especially now that the Director of National Intelligence proclaimed that Gadhafi would eventually beat back the opposition, unless there’s some serious outside support. But NATO stopped short of any such decision on Thursday. A raft of U.S. military leaders, from Defense Secretary Robert Gates to Adm. Michael Mullen to Gen. James Mattis of Central Command, have warned that a no-fly zone is neither a simple or antiseptic operation.

Air Force leaders and veterans of no-fly campaigns contacted by Danger Room agree with that caution. Keeping Gadhafi’s planes and helicopters out of the sky is no cakewalk, and the objectives are anything but clear. But they sketched out the following picture of what one might look like.

Blowing up Libya’s surface-to-air defenses is the first wave of a no-fly campaign, as Secretary Gates noted. But to do that, there’s an even more preliminary step: use the AWACS surveillance and command planes that NATO is now flying 24-7 to find Libya’s radars, command and control and missile stations. “I’m absolutely certain,” says retired Gen. Pete Piotrowski, a former Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, “that the intelligence community knows the location of the surface to air missiles and the radars,” thanks to the AWACS.

High-speed anti-radiation missiles, or HARMs, can then take out the radars — which would render the Libyans’ missiles dumb without having to take out every missile station. Bombing would take care of the Libyan command and control centers, too, once AWACS identifies them. And a blind Libyan air command can’t challenge NATO aircraft. “If you take out the command and control, [the Libyans] may get lucky,” says retired Maj. Gen. Irv Halter, who helped run Operation Northern Watch, the no-fly zone over northern Iraq, “but they’ll be looking through a soda straw.”

A trickier target will be the Libyan fleet of attack helicopters, which Marine Commandant James Amos identified as a crucial part of Gadhafi’s arsenal. While it’s possible that precision weaponry from the NATO aircraft thousands of feet above could take the copters out, military analyst Kori Schake of the Hoover Institution suggests using French and British carriers in the southern Mediterranean to launch helicopters of NATO’s own, plus “missiles and naval gunfire” to keep the copters grounded. (There’s also talk of cratering runways and helicopter staging areas, so the aircraft can’t get off of the ground.)

Halter notices something significant about the Libyan MiG and Mirage jets: They’re flying at about 15,000 feet, and only during the day. That tells him they’re worried about shoulder-fired and truck-launched missiles from the rebels beneath them, and their own pilots aren’t very accurate at night. Accordingly, that means any Combat Air Patrol to keep the Libyans out of the sky should cover the daylight hours — 14, 16 hours at most.

Piotrowski’s calculation is to run four Combat Air Patrols, or CAPs, of two aircraft each during that time: F-15s, F-16s, maybe with the F/A-18s from the Navy or Marines, equipped with air-to-air missiles to shoot down Libyan planes if necessary. (Retired Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula recently wrote that NATO should use F-22 Raptors, but Irving said the Raptor’s stealth capabilities weren’t necessary for Libya; besides, there aren’t any F-22s based in Europe.) From Irving’s perspective, an open-ended mission would require about 50 fighters — F-15s and -16s, plus British Tornadoes and French Mirages — with eight planes in the air at all times during the CAPs. He also advises keeping at least 10 and up to 20 KC-135 airborne tankers in the skies to allow for refueling — meaning those tankers won’t be helping planes over Afghanistan refuel.

Where would those planes fly from? In addition to keeping an aircraft carrier in the southern Mediterranean, pretty much everyone agrees that the ideal base to support a no-fly mission is Naval Air Station Sigonella in Sicily, about 300 miles from Libya. It’s got “a good runway, a good taxiway that can act as an alternate/emergency runway, reasonable amounts of parking for large and small aircraft alike, and of course housing for the operations and maintenance crews for a Northern Watch-level of resources,” says retired Col. Rod Zastrow, another Northern Watch veteran.

Zastrow thinks Northern Watch, a mission that lasted over a decade, is particularly illustrative for Libya. “We would have roughly four F-15 aircraft flying what I would call ‘top cover’ and then a number of aircraft below or near us ready to engage any [surface-to-air missiles] that might pop up or to drop bombs on pop-up AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] or pre-approved targets as retribution for AAA fired on us on the current mission,” he recalls. Add up all the AWACS, other intelligence aircraft, refuelers and fighters, and by by 1999, the U.S. had 24 planes in the air “to cover maybe a three-hour window on a roughly every-other-day schedule.”

If all this seems like a large commitment, on an open-ended schedule, it should. All the debate over a no-fly zone hasn’t resolved just what the goal of the mission would be. Buying time for the rebels on the ground? Eventually taking out Gadhafi’s ground forces — which, after all, do the majority of the fighting? Staying until Gadhafi is overthrown? Also, what would the rules of engagement be? Anything that flies during the day dies? Just fighter aircraft, or would Libyan troop transport copters be fair game? And remember, as Irving reminds, “anything you use for this, you are choosing not to use them for something else.”

Piotrowski says the no-fly zone should only be imposed if NATO is planning to do other things to tip the military balance to Gadhafi’s enemies. Whether it’s equipping the rebels or getting a proxy Arab force to help them on the ground — Piotrowski balks at NATO planes providing close air support to the Libyan rebels — the fact that NATO will be intervening means it needs “something leading to the overthrow of Gadhafi.” All of a sudden, a no-fly zone — which, after all, is an act of war — doesn’t seem so antiseptic. No wonder NATO isn’t exactly jumping to set one up.

Why No-Fly is Flawed Strategy
posted at 3:24 pm on March 11, 2011 by J.E. Dyer

John Kerry’s opinion piece in the March 11 Washington Post, which analyzes the no-fly zone option for Libya, throws into useful relief the reasons why the U.S. Defense Department would approach a no-fly zone (NFZ) with reluctance. Kerry’s editorial is quite reasonable; and with the Obama administration so silent on the policy argument, it’s good to have someone in public office lay out a careful case for an NFZ. But Kerry’s case is pretty much what we would expect it to be. The narrow purpose of an NFZ would be preventing Qaddafi from mounting air attacks on his people.
The important military concern about framing an NFZ this way is that it ignores what Qaddafi’s ultimate objective is. He is not using military force because he wants to slaughter his people. He is using it for the conventional purpose of re-conquering the territory of Libya. He may not care very much how many people he kills, but his goal isn’t killing them, it’s retaking territory and restoring the status quo ante.

In this, Qaddafi is unlike Saddam Hussein and the Serbian thugs of the 1990s. Saddam sought to put down the ethnic insurgencies that were a perennial problem for him, but he was not fighting a conventional war of movement – of territory lost and retaken – inside his borders. (In only one case, when he brutally quelled the southern Shi’as after the coalition withdrawal from Desert Storm, was reestablishing sovereign control of territory even partly at issue.)

The fundamental feature of the problem for Saddam was the existence of the restive ethnic groups. The Serb leaders in Bosnia in the 1990s were in much the same case, according to their perception. Although territory was in dispute (in a thoroughly non-linear battle space), that was not the central issue of the conflict. The principal problem, from the Serbs’ perspective, was the presence of Muslims.

In both cases, the strategic objective of the attacks was eradicating ethnic enemies. That is not the kind of war Qaddafi is fighting. There is certainly an element of internal discord in Libya, centered on the tribal structure, but it has little in common with the fathomless, centuries-old Serb-Muslim divide or the divisions within Saddam’s Iraq, which involved the irreconcilable Kurds in the north and the Shi’a “Marsh Arabs” of the river delta in the south, ruled by Saddam’s secularist Sunni cohort. These features are not present in Qaddafi’s strategic problem.

The crucial point for policy and strategy flows from this reality. An NFZ could be largely effective in keeping Qaddafi’s aircraft on the ground, but still not prevent him from retaking Libya. At the moment, the rebels are poorly armed and without coherent strategic leadership. CIA director James Clapper was terribly impolitic in his unnecessary prognostication this week that Qaddafi would prevail, but his analysis wasn’t invalid. (It is illuminating to consider that he and Obama discuss these matters on a regular basis. There is a sort of clinical dispassion about distant events hovering over their public utterances: an assumption they don’t give voice to – because they see no need to – that U.S. leaders can spitball ideas and pop up with prejudicial analyses in public and it won’t matter.)

The NFZ enforced in Bosnia in the mid-1990s is instructive in this regard. Operation Deny Flight was launched in April 1993 and was enforced for more than two years while the Bosnian Serb forces committed many of the terrible atrocities remembered by the West. The siege of Srebrenica in 1993 was mounted with battlefield artillery, as were the near-daily poundings of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities throughout the period of the NFZ. Srebrenica was held under siege conditions by the Serbs in 1995 with artillery and motorized infantry, even while it was supposedly a UN-protected enclave. The NFZ prevented fixed-wing aircraft from being used by the Serbs, and inhibited (but did not quash entirely) the use of helicopters. But it didn’t prevent the Serbs from gaining control of territory, holding urban enclaves at risk, and killing Muslim civilians.

What did eventually drive the Serbs back was the air strike and Tomahawk missile campaign of September 1995, in which NATO destroyed the Serbs’ air defenses and gave the Bosnian government’s troops (the recognized unity government led by Bosnian Muslims) the advantage in destroying or capturing Serb-held positions.

Qaddafi can defeat the rebels without the freedom to use airpower whenever he wants – unless the rebels are armed and organized by an outside force. As excruciating as it was to watch Bob Gates give alibi after alibi to Congress about why an NFZ is just too darn hard, there is an important sense in which reason is on the side of viewing an NFZ with extreme reluctance. It doesn’t address the real problem in Libya, which is the fact that Qaddafi could still regain control of the country.

None of this means that there is nothing to be done about the awful events in Libya. It does mean that a narrowly conceived NFZ – one whose purpose is so narrow even John Kerry would endorse it – is miss targeted. If we enforce an NFZ on Qaddafi while he re-conquers Libya – then what?

Orion cette rhétorique est déjà caduque puisque la France a indiqué qu'ils vont faire des frappes aériennes contre les blindés qui s'approchent de Bengazi.

Toute une autre dynamique!

--Luc

Godspeed à nos aviateurs en Lybie.


http://www.cyberpresse.ca/international ... cueil_POS1

http://tvanouvelles.ca/lcn/infos/nation ... 75730.html
Un autre reportage qui nous permet d en savoir encore un peu plus même ce que l on croyait secret bien gardé :roll: :wink:
Dolorès

J'ai eu la chance de voler avec Sylvie. Très bonne pilote! En plus, des fois, il arrivait qu'elles étaient un équipage complet de filles! Je vous laisse deviner dans quel machine les gars voulaient se retrouver dedans! 8)

pipstah wrote:J'ai eu la chance de voler avec Sylvie. Très bonne pilote! En plus, des fois, il arrivait qu'elles étaient un équipage complet de filles! Je vous laisse deviner dans quel machine les gars voulaient se retrouver dedans! 8)

Ils devaient ne pas avoir assez de sièges pour tout les gars qui espéraient embarqués :lol: :lol: :lol:
Dolorès :wink: